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What Pearson does, in effect, is split the Massachusetts
statute. It applies the first part of that statute which gives rise
to the liability, but disregards the second part which limits the
amount of that liability. It could be argued that the splitting
of the Massachusetts statute in the present case did not prejudice
the defendant because in either jurisdiction it would have been
liable for damages.3 7  It would seem that this argument could
not be made if, for example, the Massachusetts statute, instead
of limiting the liability of carriers, had made them immune from
suit. The question would then arise whether a court, following
the Pearson rationale, could constitutionally apply the part of the
Massachusetts statute which gives a cause of action for wrongful
death, and disregard the part of that statute which would make
the defendant immune from such suit.38  Certainly, such a splitting
of the Massachusetts statute would prejudice the rights of the
defendant. Application of the Pearson rationale, under such
circumstances, would seem to undermine the entire rationale of
the full faith and credit clause.
M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROC-
ESS - APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL REQUIRED FOR INDIGENT DE-
FENDANT IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES. - Petitioner, an indigent de-
fendant, convicted in a Florida state court of a felony - breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor - filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Supreme Court of Florida alleging that
the refusal of the trial court to appoint defense counsel was a
denial of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment of the federal constitution.' That court denied relief.
37 However, the dissent in Pearson would not make such an argument.
A layman would certainly feel that he would have been prejudiced if his
liability were extended from $15,000 to $160,000 (the amount recovered by
the plaintiff in the present case). Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra
note 32, at 567-68.
38 The argument has also been made that since the Massachusetts statute
is the source of the plaintiff's right to maintain the wrongful death action,
the Massachusetts legislature, by providing for the liability limitation,
intended to create only a limited right where none existed before. 35 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 357, 361 (1961).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that, "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
Under the laws of the State of Florida, however, a court can only appoint
counsel in criminal cases where a capital offense is charged. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §909.21 (1944).
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The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, and held the
sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel to be so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment 2  requires the states to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal cases.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4291 (March 18, 1963).
The rights of the individual as guaranteed by the first eight
amendments of the federal constitution are considered to be in-
alienable. At various times, the Supreme Court has extended
the protection of certain of these rights so as to preserve them from
state as well as federal intervention.3 It could be stated, more-
over, that one of the most effective and direct methods of insuring
the protection of these rights would be to provide the individual
with the assistance and guidance of counsel. This would seem
especially necessary in the criminal area where a violation of the
accused's right to due process of law often leads to imprisonment,
and in some cases, death.
There is no question that a defendant in a criminal prosecution
in a federal court has an unqualified right to the assistance of
counsel. In Johnson v. Zerbst,4 the Supreme Court stated that
the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel withholds from federal
courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to
deprive an accused of his life or liberty without counsel unless he
has effectively waived this right.5 The right to counsel was held
to be necessary to insure fundamental due process to the de-
fendant.6 In state criminal prosecutions the constitutional right
to counsel is also unqualified when the accused has sufficient means
to employ counsel of his own.7 The right of an indigent defendant,
however, has not been considered as absolute, and the question
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part that, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "
3 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (freedom of press);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); Staub
v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (freedom of speech; Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protection from unlawful searches and
seizures); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual
punishment). But see, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
where the Court held that due process of law does not include the fifth
amendment's guarantee of an indictment by a grand jury; Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), where the Court held that the fifth amend-
ment's guarantee against double jeopardy does not apply to the states.
4 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5 Id. at 463; Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 254-55 (N.D. Ga.
1935) ; see Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 9 (1944).
OJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
7 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954). There the defendant was
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of whether a state's refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent
violates due process requirements has been the subject of numerous
habeas corpus petitions over the past thirty years.
This question of the indigent's right to counsel was before
the Supreme Court in the famous case of Powell v. Alabama.8
In that case, seven defendants were convicted, in an Alabama
state court, of the crime of rape, a capital offense in Alabama.
The trial court had not appointed counsel until the day of the
trial.9 The Court in reversing the conviction stressed the fact
that the right to counsel also includes the opportunity to prepare
a defense.' 0  It stated that under the circumstances-the youth,
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, the fact that they were
surrounded by a great deal of public hostility and most important
the fact that they were on trial for their lives--"the necessity
of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial
court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 11
In Betts v. Brady,12 however, the Court determined that the
decision in Powell was restricted to its individual facts. In Betts,
the petitioner, convicted of robbery in a Maryland state court,
contended that the refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel was
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In affirming the conviction, the Court stated that the right
to counsel in the sixth amendment applies only to trials in
informed on the day of the trial that not only was he to be charged with
larceny but also with being an habitual criminal. His waiver of counsel on
the larceny charge was held not to affect his right to obtain counsel for the
habitual criminal charge, and the refusal of the trial court to allow him
an opportunity to do so violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
8 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9 The fact that counsel was not appointed until the day of trial was due
to a misunderstanding between the trial judge and the local bar association.
The judge had appointed the entire bar to represent the defendants at the
arraignment; however no one member did anything by way of preparation
for the defense.
10 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see also Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) wherein it was held that "the denial of op-
portunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and
to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham
and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's require-
ment that an accused be given the assistance of counsel." Id. at 446; cf.
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), where a statute which prohibited
a defendant from testifying in his own behalf in a capital case was held
to violate due process of law. If such a statute were given effect, then the
right to counsel would be of little worth.
11 Powell v. Alabama, supra note 10.
12 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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federal courts.13 While the fourteenth amendment does not in-
corporate as such the specific guarantees found in the sixth
amendment, a denial by a state of rights specifically embodied in
that amendment could, under certain circumstances, deprive an
accused of due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.1 4  In a poll of state law, the Court concluded that
the majority *of jurisdictions did not consider the appointment
of counsel a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.15
In cases subsequent to Betts, the Court has applied the special
circumstances test of Betts to determine whether the failure to
appoint counsel violated due process requirements. The Court
has not only adhered to the circumstances found in the Powell
case, but has also held such factors as questionable sanity,16
peculiarity of the crime' 7 and the pleading of a defense at an
arraignment proceeding' s sufficient to require the appointment
of counsel.
In reaching its decision in the instant case, that the states
must appoint counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal cases,
the Court expressly overruled its decision in Betts.19 The Court
stated that the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel is funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial, and is therefore made obligatory
upon the states by the fourteenth amendment.2 0  The Court,
adopting the rationale of Powell, stated that the right to be heard
would be meaningless unless it was a right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent defendant does not possess the necessary
legal training to determine such elements as: (1) the accuracy
13 Id. at 461; see Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 662-63 (1948).
'
4 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
15 Id.. at 471.
i6 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.- 155 (1957).
'7 Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (sexual intercourse with
thirteen-year old daughter).
18 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (Alabama procedure re-
quired that the defense of insanity be pleaded at the arraignment or else it is
deemed waived. The Court held that counsel must be appointed for the
arraignment).
19 Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4291, 4292 (March 18, 1963);
Mr. Justice Black, the author of the majority opinion in the instant case,
has been opposed to Betts since the day it was decided, as is evidenced by
his dissenting opinion in that case. Recently in Carnley v. Cochran, supra
note 17, at 519, he wrote, in a concurring opinion, that Betts was a denial
of fundamental fairness and shocking to the universal sense of justice.
Further, the decision has not served as a guide, but has only confused the
state courts as to when a defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed.
20 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 19, at 4293; see Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) where the Court stated that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects from state action the rights of
the individual guaranteed by the first eight amendments. Id. at 243-44.
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of the indictment, (2) the competency and admissibility of evi-
dence, (3) the correctness of a charge, and (4) the preparation
of a defense.21  The Court concluded that unless the poor man
charged with a crime is also guaranteed the assistance of counsel,
the ideal of "fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law" 22 could not be realized.
In holding that the Constitution requires the states to appoint
counsel in all criminal cases, the Court has undoubtedly raised
serious questions as to what, if any, procedural and substantive
changes the states will be required to make to satisfy constitutional
requirements. It has already been noted that the Court in Powell
did not consider appointment of counsel on the day of trial to be
due process of law. But, in the next few years the Court will be
faced with far more subtle issues. Of these will be the question
of at what stage in its criminal proceedings must a state provide
for the appointment of counsel.
Under the present federal procedure, counsel must be ap-
pointed for an indigent defendant at the arraignment to the in-
dictment, unless the defendant effectively waives his right.2 A
defendant, however, does not have the right to the assignment of
counsel at the time he is brought before a commissioner subse-
quent to his arrest. It is only required that the commissioner
inform the defendant of his right to retain his own counsel, and
allow him time to do so if he so wishes. 24  An amendment has
21 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 19, at 4294.
22 Ibid.
23 FFD. R. CRIm. P. 44 provides that "if the defendant appears in court
without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign
counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects
to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." See McNair v.
United States, 235 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 989
(1957) ; United States v. Kratz, 97 F. Supp. 999 (D. Neb. 1951); 4 BARRON,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PaOCEDURE § 2462 (Rules ed. 1951). The author
notes that Rule 44 was designed to indicate that the right to have counsel
appointed by the court relates only to proceedings in court, and, therefore,
does not include preliminary proceedings before a commissioner. In Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), the Court held that for a waiver of
counsel to be effective it must be made intelligently and understandingly.
The circumstances presented-defendant was 17 years of age with only a
seventh-grade education and a possible question as to his sanity-made an
effective waiver impossible. Id. at 164-65.
24 FED. R. CRIem. P. 5(b) provides that "the Commissioner shall inform
the defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel
and of his right to have a preliminary examination." This Rule has been
interpreted to mean that there is no right to have counsel appointed at the
proceedings before the commissioner. Burall v. Johnston, 146 F2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); United States v. Killough, 193
F. Supp. 905, 914 (D.D.C. 1961); Rackow, The Right to Counsel-Time
for Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, 10 W. REs. L. REv. 216,
230 (1959).
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been proposed, however, to change the procedure before the
commissioner.2 '5  This amendment, if adopted, would require the
commissioner not only to inform the defendant of his right to retain
his own counsel, but also of his right to request the assignment of
counsel.
The procedure in New York is similar to the federal procedure
when a defendant is charged with a felony. Section 308 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure requires the court to appoint counsel
for the indigent defendant at the arraignment to the indictment.
26
Section 188 gives no right to appointment of counsel before the
committing magistrate, but the magistrate, like the federal com-
missioner, must inform the defendant of his right to retain his
own counsel.2 7  There are, however, presently no proposed changes
for the New York procedure. But this is not to say that New
York does not recognize the need for counsel before the arraign-
ment stage of its proceeding. The Court of Appeals has recently
held that statements made to the police after the arraignment to
the charge but prior to the indictment are inadmissible as evidence
unless given by a defendant who had the benefit of counsel at the
time.28
But, should the Supreme Court adopt the proposed amendment
to the Federal Rules, the question arises whether the change would
indicate that the Court considers appointment of counsel before
the commissioner necessary to meet due process requirements. 29
25 COMMrITTEE ON RULEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, PRELImINARY DRAFT or PROPOSED ANIENDMENTS TO RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURTS, Rule 5
(1962). The committee's notes on the proposed change of Rule 44 state
that the purpose of the amendments to that Rule and Rule 5 is "to provide
for the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants at the earliest possible
time and without waiting until the defendant appears in court."
26N.Y. CODE CRir. PROC. § 308 provides that "if the defendant appears
for arraignment without counsel, he must be asked if he desires the aid of
counsel, and if he does the court must assign counsel." In People v. Crimi,
278 App. Div. 997, 105 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d Dep't 1951) (memorandum
opinion), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 749, 103 N.E.2d 538 (1952) (memorandum opinion)
the Appellate Division held that a 16 year old defendant's personal inter-
pretation of advice given by the court as to his right to appointed counsel
was insufficient to show that the defendant had not effectively waived his
right to counsel.
27 N.Y. CODE CatM. PROC. § 188 provides that "when the defendant is
brought before a magistrate upon an arrest . . . the magistrate must im-
mediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his right to the
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings and before any further
proceedings are had." Section 189 requires the magistrate to allow the
defendant reasonable time to send for counsel.
28People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427
(1962). For an interesting treatment of this case see 37 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
155 (1962).
29 It has been stated before that the crucial time for the assistance of
1963 ]
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If it does, then it would seem that the instant case would require
New York, and the other states also, to provide for appointment at
that stage.
The requirement of appointment of counsel in all criminal
cases will also greatly affect the states on the question of the
type of crimes for which appointment of counsel will be required.
In the federal courts, the sixth amendment has been interpreted
to require appointment of counsel in both felony and misdemeanor
cases.30 The majority of states, on the other hand, only provide
for appointment of counsel in felony cases.31  While it is clear
in New York that section 308 applies in felony cases, 82 the right
of an indigent defendant, under that section, to have counsel
appointed in a misdemeanor case is subject to conflicting views.
One author is of the opinion that such a right does exist.33  On
the other hand, the small amount of decision writing on this
point is to the effect that the right to counsel under section 308
is only applicable to crimes which are prosecuted by an indictment. 34
In any event, such a conflict is now academic for the position of
the Court in the instant case on this question is open to but one
interpretation, i.e., that appointment of counsel in all criminal cases
also includes misdemeanor prosecutions. It is thus clear that this
decision will require immediate changes in many state procedures.
counsel is at the very beginning of the case, long before the trial stage is
reached. An accused person needs counsel soon after arrest and before
anything is done to prejudice his rights. Slovenko, Representation for
Indiaent Defendants, 33 TUL. L. Rav. 363, 370-71 (1959); 1 CHA=.
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 541 (1951), states that "a person needs a
lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at any other time."
30McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (19o) (assault with intent to
murder); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (counterfeiting); Evans
v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (nonsupport and maintenance of a
minor child); Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ga. 1935)
(counterfeiting); see Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel In
Federal Courts, 30 NFB. L. REV. 559 (1951), wherein the author states that
"-no reason appears in logic, morals, or humanity' why any person accused
of any crime should be denied this fundamental right." Id. at 594.31 See the appendix to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in
McNeal v. Culver, supra note 30, at 119-22, where it is noted that thirty-five
states provide for appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in felony
cases only, and the other fifteen states either make no explicit provision for
appointment of counsel, or provide for appointment only in capital cases, or
leave the appointment of counsel to the discretion of the trial judge.
32 People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 413, 187 N.E. 298, 299 (1933); People
v. Borgstrom, 178 N.Y. 254, 256, 70 N.E. 780 (1904) ; People v. Crimi, supra
note 26.
33 Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and
to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. lav. 24 (1961), citing People v.
Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957) (defendant
not given opportunity to obtain own counsel).
34 People v. Meers, 28 Misc. 2d 60, 211 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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The more difficult questions, however, will arise in the area
where the charge is technically neither a felony nor a misdemeanor.
Juvenile offenses, for example, are in such a class in New York.3 5
Since such offenses, if committed by an adult, would be felonies
or misdemeanors, the legislature has taken steps to protect the
rights of the juvenile by providing that similar rules of pro-
cedure and evidence apply in the juvenile hearing.36 Also, since
there is little doubt that the juvenile who has been placed in a
reformatory, because of his delinquency, has been deprived of his
liberty, there is a question of whether a juvenile hearing comes
within the meaning of a criminal case, and whether the Supreme
Court will also require appointment of counsel for indigent
delinquents.3 7
Somewhat analogous to the juvenile offense is the traffic viola-
tion. While such violations are neither felonies nor misdemeanors,
a number of violations within a certain period of time will result
in a revocation of a license.3s A revocation of a license would
seriously affect, for example, the unemployed person whose liveli-
hood requires him to drive a car or truck. Under such cir-
cumstances, the revocation would not only be a deprivation of
property, but also the means to earn a living. Considering these
serious consequences, it might be argued that due process would
require the appointment of counsel for the indigent motorist.
The determination of whether a defendant should be classified
as an indigent and thus have the right to have counsel appointed
will also present a perplexing problem to the state courts. Since
such determinations, by their very nature, will depend upon the
facts in the individual case, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will be able to establish a workable rule to assist the states on
this question. The courts will be faced, for example, with the
problem of a migrant worker who, with $80 in his pocket, is
35 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2186 provides in part that "a child of more than
seven and less than sixteen years of age, who shall commit any act or
omission which is committed by an adult, would be a crime, except any child
fifteen years of age who commits an act which if committed by an adult
would be punishable by death or life imprisonment, . . . shall not be deemed
guilty of any crime, but of juvenile delinquency only. .. "36 See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932);
People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 312-13, 155 N.E. 584, 586-87 (1927)
PAPERNO & GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 158(a)(1960).37A similar question will arise in the prosecution of youthful offenders.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 913-e-913-r; see People v. Manfredi, 27 Misc. 2d
7, 8, 215 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (Schenectady County Ct. 1960), where it was
held that a youthful offender trial is essentially a criminal trial.38 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 510(2) (c) provides for mandatory
revocation of a license where three speeding violations are committed within
eighteen months.
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arrested for disorderly conduct. Does the fact that he has $80
mean that he must supply his own counsel? Another example
is the worker who earns just enough to supply his family.
Should such a person be required to incur debt to obtain counsel,
or should he be classified as an indigent and therefore have
counsel appointed? 39 It is to be noted that the answers to these
questions will have greater significance than ever before. An
erroneous determination on the question of a defendant's right to
have counsel appointed will result in a reversal of a conviction,
since the failure to appoint counsel will now be deemed a violation
of due process of law.
The decision of the Court, in the instant case, will no doubt
have a great effect upon the criminal proceedings in state courts.
It will require the states to re-examine and, in the majority of
cases, amend their laws so as to conform with the requirements of
the Constitution. Such examinations and amendments will not
come easy in some cases since it has long been considered the
right of the individual state to determine the procedure to be
followed in its courts.
As to the correctness and desirability of the decision, however,
there would seem to be little doubt. When one considers the
complexities of a criminal prosecution, and the economic and social
effects a conviction has upon a defendant, the need for counsel
for all defendants is clearly shown. It makes little sense to say
that due process of law requires an opportunity be given the
defendant who has the means to employ counsel to protect his
rights, and then to say that the same law does not require that
counsel be appointed to assist the indigent defendant who has the
same rights at stake. If the above statement be true, then it
might well be said that the decision in the instant case has
been long overdue.
3 Under the present New York law a person may defend or prosecute
as a poor person in a civil action if he "is not worth three hundred dollars
in cash or available property besides the wearing apparel and furniture
necessary for himself and his family .... ." N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 35, 37.
Under such circumstances the court also assign counsel. N.Y.R. Cirv.
PRAc. 36. Would such a test be constitutionally acceptable in the
criminal area? Under the new Civil Practice Law and Rules the three
hundred dollar requirement has been eliminated for the more flexible
test of whether or not the party is "unable to pay the costs, fees and
expenses necessary to prosecute or defend the action ... " N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAw & RULES § 1101(a).
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